Recent developments in differentially private (DP) machine learning and DP Bayesian learning have enabled learning under strong privacy guarantees for the training data subjects. In this paper, we further extend the applicability of DP Bayesian learning by presenting the first general DP Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm whose privacy-guarantees are not subject to unrealistic assumptions on Markov chain convergence and that is applicable to posterior inference in arbitrary models. Our algorithm is based on a decomposition of the Barker acceptance test that allows evaluating the Rényi DP privacy cost of the acceptreject choice. We further show how to improve the DP guarantee through data subsampling and approximate acceptance tests.
Introduction
Differential privacy (DP) [Dwork et al., 2006, Dwork and Roth, 2014] and its generalisations to concentrated DP Rothblum, 2016, Bun and Steinke, 2016] and Rényi DP [Mironov, 2017] have recently emerged as the dominant framework for privacy-preserving machine learning. There are DP versions of many popular machine learning algorithms, including highly popular and effective DP stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [Abadi et al., 2016] for optimisationbased learning.
There has also been a fair amount of work in DP Bayesian machine learning, with the proposed approaches falling to three main categories: DP perturbation of sufficient statistics for inference in exponential family models [e.g. , Park et al., 2016 , Honkela et al., 2018 , Bernstein and Sheldon, 2018 , gradient perturbation similar to DP SGD for stochastic gradient Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) and variational inference [e.g. Wang et al., 2015 , Jälkö et al., 2017 , Li et al., 2017 , and DP guarantees for sampling from the exact posterior typically realised using MCMC [e.g. Dimitrakakis et al., 2014 , Dimitrakakis et al., 2017 , Geumlek et al., 2017 .
None of these provide fully general solutions: sufficient statistic perturbation methods are limited to a restricted set of models while stochastic gradient methods lack theoretical convergence guarantees and are limited to models with continuous variables. Posterior sampling methods are applicable to general models and come with theoretical accuracy guarantees, but the privacy is conditional on exact sampling from the posterior, which is usually impossible to verify in practice.
In this paper, we present a new generic DP-MCMC method with strict, non-asymptotic privacy guarantees that hold independently of the chain's convergence. Our method is based on a recent Barker acceptance test formulation [Seita et al., 2017 ].
Our contribution
We present the first general-purpose differentially private MCMC method with a DP guarantee under mild assumptions on the target distribution. We further strengthen the DP guarantee of the exact method through a subsampling-based approximation that can provide DP with a smaller privacy loss. We also improve on the existing method for subsampled MCMC, resulting in a significantly more accurate method for correcting the subsampling induced noise distribution.
2 Background 2.1 Differential privacy Definition 1 (Differential privacy). A randomized algorithm M : D → S satisfies ( , δ) differential privacy, if for all adjacent datasets D, D and for all S ⊂ S it holds that Pr(M(D) ∈ S) ≤ e Pr(M(D ) ∈ S) + δ.
(1)
Adjacency here means that |D| = |D |, and D differs from D by a single element, e.g. by a single row corresponding to one individual's data in a data matrix.
Recently Mironov [2017] proposed a Rényi divergence [Rényi, 1961] based relaxation for differential privacy called Rényi differential privacy (RDP).
Definition 2 (Rényi divergence). Rényi divergence between two distributions P and Q defined over S is defined as
Definition 3 (Rényi differential privacy). A randomized algorithm M : D → S is (α, )-RDP, if for all adjacent datasets D, D it holds that 
Like DP, RDP has many useful properties such as invariance to post-processing. The main advantage of RDP compared to DP is the theory providing tight bounds for doing adaptive compositions, i.e., for combining the privacy losses from several possibly adaptive mechanisms accessing the same data, and subsampling. We will state these as Propositions.
Proposition 1. A composition of two RDP algorithms M 1 , M 2 with RDP guarantees (α, 1 ) and (α, 2 ), is (α, 1 + 2 )-RDP.
Proof. See Mironov 2017, Proposition 1 .
The next result follows immediately from Proposition 1.
Corollary 1. Releasing a result from a T -fold composition of a (α, )-RDP query is (α, T )-RDP.
The following Proposition states the privacy amplification via subsampling result of Wang et al. [2018] .
Proposition 2. A randomised algorithm M which accesses the whole dataset D only through subset B of the dataset and satisfies (α, )-RDP w.r.t. to B, is (α, )-RDP with
where q = |B|/|D|, and α ≥ 2 is an integer.
Proof. See Wang et al. 2018, Theorem 10 .
Finally, we can convert RDP privacy guarantees back to ( , δ)-DP guarantees using the following proposition.
Proposition 3. An (α, )-RDP algorithm M also satisfies ( , δ)-DP for all 0 < δ < 1 with
Proof. See Mironov 2017, Proposition 3 .
MCMC and Barker acceptance
The fundamental idea in standard MCMC methods [Brooks et al., 2011] is that a distribution π(θ) that can only be evaluated up to a normalising constant, is approximated by samples θ 1 , . . . , θ t generated from a suitable Markov chain. Denoting the current parameter values by θ, the next value is generated using a proposal θ drawn from a proposal distribution q(θ |θ) that is easy to sample from. An acceptance test is then used to determine if the chain should move to the proposed value or stay at the current one.
Denoting the acceptance probability by α(θ , θ), a test that satisfies detailed balance π(θ)q(θ |θ)α(θ , θ) = π(θ )q(θ|θ )α(θ, θ ) together with ergodicity of the chain are sufficient conditions to guarantee asymptotic convergence to the correct invariant distribution π(θ).
In Bayesian inference, we are typically interested in sampling from the posterior distribution, i.e., π(θ) ∝ p(x|θ)p(θ). The Metropolis-Hastings acceptance probability [Metropolis et al., 1953 , Hastings, 1970 is then defined as
and the actual test compares this to u ∼ U (0, 1), where U is the uniform distribution, i.e., we accept θ if α M (θ , θ) > u.
However, it is computationally infeasible to use (5) with large datasets, since each iteration requires evaluating p(x| ). To solve this problem, Seita et al. [2017] formulate a test that only uses a fraction of the data at each iteration. In the rest of this Section and in Section 2.3, we rephrase their arguments most relevant for our approach for convenience. We start by assuming the data are exchangeable, so p(x| ) = i p(x i | ), and replacing the Metropolis-Hastings test (5) by a form of Barker acceptance test [Barker, 1965] :
satisfies detailed balance.
Proof. First note that ∆(θ , θ) = −∆(θ, θ ). Now by using simple algebra we obtain
Let g(s) = (1 + exp(−s)) −1 . Since g is monotonically increasing, it has a well-defined and unique inverse. It is easy to check that g also satisfies the condition in Lemma 1, and we can therefore maintain detailed balance and have
where X log has a standard logistic distribution, and (10) follows because X log is symmetric.
Subsampled MCMC
In order to define an acceptance test that only uses a random sample of size b instead of the full data, let
where the summation over [b] means a sum over the samples in the batch. Omitting the parameters for brevity, ∆ * is now an unbiased estimator for ∆, and assuming x i are random samples from the data distribution, log p(x i |θ ) p(x i |θ) are iid, and ∆ * has approximately normal distribution by the Central Limit Theorem.
We therefore have
whereX norm is approximately normal with some variance σ 2 (∆ * ).
Since the standard logistic variable X log in (10) has variance π 2 /3, assume
for some constant C. Let X norm and X nc be independent zero-mean Gaussian variables with variances σ 2 = σ 2 (∆ * ) and σ 2 nc = C −σ 2 (∆ * ), respectively, and assume we can find a correction variable X
Then, suppressing the superscript from X (C) cor for brevity, we have
where (16) becomes equality asymptotically. In this case, testing if
is exactly equivalent to (10).
In order to guarantee small enough variance σ 2 (∆ * ) as in (13), Seita et al. [2017] adapt the batch size b. However, this does not work well in our case due to problems with privacy amplification. Instead, we guarantee this either by relying on Lipschitz log-likelihoods or by clipping the log-likelihood ratios. We return to this topic in detail in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
Since (14) holds for no known distribution X cor with an analytical expression, we use an approximation. Seita et al. [2017] construct an approximation by discretising the convolution implicit in (14), and turning the problem into a ridge regression problem which can be solved easily. Although their method works well in practice for small enough C, it does not seem to give reasonable results for larger C. Since we use C = 2 in our privacy analysis in Section 3.2, we use a different approximation strategy detailed in Section 3.3, which gives good empirical performance for larger C as well.
In practice, the acceptance test (18) is an approximation, so the stationary distribution of the chain is not the exact posterior. In general, we can expect to stay reasonably close to the true posterior when the approximation errors are small. In some cases, there are known theoretical upper bounds for the errors induced. Since these bounds rely on some assumptions that can be hard to meet in general however, we defer them to the Appendix.
Tempering
With very large sample size N, one general problem in Bayesian inference is that the standard posterior includes more and more details, often leading to models that are much harder to interpret while only marginally more accurate than simpler models (see e.g. Miller and Dunson 2018) .
One way of addressing this issue is to scale the log-likelihood ratios in (6) and (11), so instead of log p(x i |θ) we would have τ log p(x i |θ) with some τ. The effect of scaling with 0 < τ < 1 is then to spread the posterior mass more widely. We will refer to this scaling as tempering.
As an interesting theoretical justification for tempering, Miller and Dunson [2018] show a relation between tempered likelihoods and modelling error. As noted, their motivation is the big data regime, where the standard posterior tends to get complicated. At the same time, the data we have, although abundant, are seldom without some errors and quirks.
The main idea is to take the error between the theoretical pure data and the actual observable data into account in the modelling. Denote the observed data with lowercase and errorless random variables with uppercase letters, and let R ∼ Exp(β). Then using empirical KL divergence as our modelling error estimator d N , instead of the standard posterior we are looking for the posterior conditional on the observed data being close to the uncorrupted data, i.e., we want p(θ|d N (x 1:N , X 1:N ) < R), which is called coarsened posterior or c-posterior.
Miller and Dunson [2018] show that with these assumptions
where ∝ ∼ means approximately proportional to, and ξ N = 1/(1 + N/β), i.e., a posterior with tempered likelihoods can be interpreted as an approximate c-posterior.
3 Privacy-preserving MCMC
DP MCMC
Our aim is to sample from the posterior distribution of the model parameters while ensuring differential privacy. We accomplish this by using the MCMC method with the Barker acceptance test discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 which is a randomised algorithm. In each MCMC iteration we access the data through the log-likelihood ratio ∆(θ, θ ), thus it suffices to release this quantity under DP to guarantee privacy of the iteration. Decomposing the logistic random variable as in Equation (14) we can reformulate the Barker acceptance test as checking if
where N D = N (∆(θ , θ), C).
In order to guarantee DP, we need a bound for the Rényi divergence between two Gaussians N D , N D corresponding to neighbouring datasets. The following Lemma gives the Rényi divergence between two Gaussians:
Lemma 2. Rényi divergence between two normals N 1 and N 2 with parameters µ 1 , σ 1 and µ 2 , σ 2 respectively is
where σ 2 α = ασ 2 2 + (1 − α)σ 2 1 .
Proof. See Gil et al. 2013 , Table 2 .
for all x i , x j and for all θ, θ . Releasing a result of the accept/reject decision based on Equation
Proof. Follows from Lemma 2. See Appendix for further details.
By using the compositional property of RDP, it is straightforward to get the following Corollary for the whole chain.
Corollary 2. Releasing an MCMC chain of T iterations, where in each iteration we have used the Barker acceptance test, satisfies (α, )-RDP with = T 2αB 2 /C.
We can satisfy the condition (22) Proof.
Clearly, if Ld θ < B we can satisfy the condition in Equation (22).
For some models, using a proposal distribution with a bounded domain could affect the ergodicity of the chain. However, even though such distributions exist and can be easily constructed, we argue that this is unlikely to happen in practice.
Considering models that are not Lipschitz or using an unbounded proposal distribution, we can also satisfy the boundedness condition (22) by clipping the likelihood ratios to a suitable interval.
DP subsampled MCMC
In previous section we showed that we can release samples from an MCMC algorithm under privacy guarantees. As discussed in Section 2.2, with large datasets computing the log-likelihood ratios might be computationally exhausting. Also, using the full dataset in the DP MCMC setting might be infeasible for privacy reasons. The noise variance C in Theorem 1 is bounded by the variance of the logistic random variable, and thus working under a strict privacy budget we might be able to run the chain for only a few iterations before in Corollary 2 exceeds our budget. Using only a subsample of the data in each MCMC iteration allows us to reduce the privacy cost by privacy amplification described in Proposition 2.
Considering privacy, in (18) we need to access the data for calculating ∆ * + X nc . Thus, it suffices to privately release a sample from N B = N (∆ * , C − s 2 ∆ * ). As noted before, we use C = 2 in the following analysis.
Next, we will state our main theorem giving an explicit bound that can be used for calculating privacy for a single MCMC iteration:
where b is the size of the minibatch B and N is the dataset size, releasing a sample from N B satisfies (α, )-RDP with
Proof. The idea of the proof is straightforward: we need to find an upper bound for each of the terms in Lemma 2, which can be done using standard techniques. See Appendix for the full derivation.
Using the composability and subsampling amplification properties of Rényi DP (Corollary 1 and Proposition 2), we get the following:
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how changing the parameters q and T in Corollary 3 will affect the privacy budget of DP MCMC.
Similar to the full data case, we can satisfy the condition (26) with sufficiently smooth likelihoods or by clipping. However, with increasing N the bound gets tighter, and to counterbalance this either the proposals need to be closer to the current value (assuming suitably smooth loglikelihood), resulting in a slower mixing chain, or b needs to increase, affecting the privacy amplification. We would therefore like to temper the log-likelihood ratios in a way that we could use sufficiently small minibatches to benefit from privacy amplification, while still preserving sufficient amount of information from the likelihoods with reasonable mixing properties. Using the c-posterior method discussed in Section 2.4 with parameter β s.t.
which does not depend on N. Figure 3 shows how frequently we need to clip the log-likelihood ratios to maintain the bound in (26) as a function of proposal variance using a Gaussian mixture model problem defined in Section 4. Using smaller proposal variance will result in smaller changes in the log-likelihoods between the previous and the proposed parameter values, which entails fewer clipped values.
Numerical approximation of the correction distribution
As noted earlier, we need a correction distribution X (C) cor s.t. (14) holds, where 0 < C < π 2 /3. Since we use C = 2 in the privacy analysis, and the ridge regression approximation used by Seita et al. [2017] breaks down quickly when C increases beyond 1, we instead use a Gaussian mixture model (GMM) to formulate a valid correction distribution.
To find the correction pdf, denote the density of the GMM approximation with K components byf cor , the GMM component parameters by π k , µ k and σ k , and the standard normal density by φ. We have
As the logistic pdf is symmetric around zero, we require our GMM approximation to be symmetric as well. We achieve this by creating a counterpart for each mixture component with an opposite sign mean and identical variance and weight. To construct the approximation on some interval [−a, a] ⊂ R, we discretise the interval into n points, and fit the GMM by minimising the loss function
calculated over the discretisation. Since GMM is a generative model, sampling from the optimised approximation is easy. Figure 4 shows the approximation error max y |S (y) − S(y)|, where S is the approximate logistic emprical cdf and S the exact logistic cdf, due toX cor using the ridge regression solution proposed by Seita et al. [2017] and the GMM. The error measure is the same as in Theorem 4 in the Appendix. Empirically, as shown in the Figure, 
Experiments
In order to demonstrate our proposed method in practice, we use a simple 2-dimensional Gaussian mixture model 2 , that has been used by Welling and Teh [2011] and Seita et al. [2017] in the non-private setting: where σ 2 1 = 10, σ 2 2 = 1, σ 2 x = 2. For the observed data, we use fixed parameter values θ = (0, 1). Following Seita et al. [2017] , we generate 10 6 samples from the model for use as training data. We use b = 1000 for the minibatches, and adjust the temperature of the chain s.t. N 0 = 100 in (30). This corresponds to the temperature used by Seita et al. [2017] in their non-private test.
Since each iteration of the chain has a privacy cost, we want to initialise it in at least somewhat reasonable location. To achieve this, we use the differentially private variational inference (DPVI) introduced by Jälkö et al. [2017] with a small privacy budget (0.21, 10 −6 ) to find a rough estimate for the initial location.
As shown in Figure 5 , the samples from the tempered chain with DP are nearly indistinguishable from the samples drawn from the non-private tempered chain.
Figures 6(a) and 6(b) illustrate how the accuracy is affected by privacy. Posterior means and variances are computed from the first t iterations of the private chain alongside the privacy cost , which increases with t. The baseline is given by a corresponding non-private chain after the same number of iterations. The plots show the mean and the standard error of the mean over 20 runs.
Related work
Bayesian posterior sampling under DP has been studied using several different approaches. Dimitrakakis et al. [2014] note that drawing a single sample from the posterior distribution of a model where the log-likelihood is Lipschitz or bounded yields a DP guarantee. The bound on can be strengthened by tempering the posterior by raising the likelihood to a power τ ∈ (0, 1) to obtain the tempered posterior π τ (θ) ∝ p(θ)p(X | θ) τ .
The same principle is discussed and extended by Wang et al. [2015] , and Dimitrakakis et al. [2017] in the classical DP setting and by Geumlek et al. [2017] in the RDP setting. Wang et al. [2015] dub this the "one posterior sample" (OPS) mechanism. The main limitation of all these methods is that the privacy guarantee is conditional on sampling from the exact posterior, which is in most realistic cases impossible to verify. Careless application of these methods may lead to serious privacy violations when a poorly mixed sampler initialised at a posterior mode can inadvertently yield very accurate models whose privacy loss is much higher than believed.
The other most widely used approach for DP Bayesian inference is perturbation of sufficient statistics of an exponential family model using the Laplace mechanism. This straightforward application of the Laplace mechanism was mentioned at least by Dwork and Smith [2009] and has been widely applied since by several authors [e.g. , Park et al., 2016 , Honkela et al., 2018 , Bernstein and Sheldon, 2018 . In particular, show that the sufficient statistics perturbation is more efficient than OPS for models where both are applicable. Furthermore, these methods can provide an unconditional privacy guarantee. Many of the early methods ignore the Laplace noise injected for DP in the inference, leading to potentially biased inference results. This weakness is addressed by Bernstein and Sheldon [2018] , who include the uncertainty arising from the injected noise in the modelling, which improves the accuracy of especially posterior variances for models where this can be done.
MCMC methods that use gradient information such as Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) and various stochastic gradient MCMC methods have become popular recently. DP variants of these were first proposed by Wang et al. [2015] and later refined by Li et al. [2017] to make use of the moments accountant [Abadi et al., 2016] . The form of the privacy guarantee for these methods is similar to that of our method: there is an unconditional guarantee for models with a differentiable Lipschitz log-likelihood that weakens as more iterations are taken. Because of the use of the gradients, these methods are limited to differentiable models and cannot be applied to e.g. models with discrete variables.
Before Seita et al. [2017] , the problem of MCMC without using the full data has been considered by many authors with varying approaches (see Bardenet et al. 2017 for a recent literature survey).
The methods most closely related to ours are the ones by Korattikara et al. [2014] and Bardenet et al. [2014] . From our perspective, the main problem with these approaches is the adaptive batch size: the algorithms may regularly need to use all observations on a single iteration [Seita et al., 2017] , which in turn increases the privacy cost significantly due to the loss of privacy amplification by subsampling effect. Bardenet et al. [2017] have more recently proposed an improved version of their previous technique, which needs smaller batches alleviating the problem. However, the reported batch sizes can still be large from the privacy perspective.
Discussion
While gradient-based samplers such as HMC are clearly dominant in the non-DP case, it is unclear how useful they will be under DP. Straightforward stochastic gradient methods such as stochastic gradient Langevin dynamics (SGLD) can be fast in initial convergence to a high posterior density region, but it is not clear if they can explore that region more efficiently. HMC does have a clear advantage at exploration, but Betancourt [2015] clearly demonstrates that HMC is very sensitive to having very accurate gradients and therefore a naive DP HMC is unlikely to perform well. We believe that using a gradient-based method such as DP variational inference [Jälkö et al., 2017] as an initialisation for the proposed method can yield overall a very efficient sampler that can take advantage of the gradients in the initial convergence and of MCMC in obtaining accurate posterior variances. Further work in benchmarking different approaches over a number of models is needed, but it is beyond the scope of this work.
The proposed method allows for structurally new kind of assumptions to guarantee privacy through forcing bounds on the proposal instead of or in addition to the likelihood. This opens the door for a lot of optimisation in the design of the proposal. It is not obvious how the proposal should be selected in order to maximise the amount of useful information obtained about the posterior under the given privacy budget, when one has to balance between sampler acceptance rate and autocorrelation and also privacy. We leave this interesting question for future work.
Appendices

A Proof of main text's Theorem 1
Denote the maximally different adjacent datasets by x 1 , x 2 . The mechanism releases a sample from N 1 = N (∆ 1 , C) , and N 2 = N (∆ 2 , C), where ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 are calculated with x 1 , x 2 , respectively.
We want to show that
assuming that either
or
Proof. W.l.o.g., we can assume that the differing element between x 1 and x 2 is the final one, so x 1,i = x 2,i , i = 1, . . . , N − 1.
Since σ 2 1 = σ 2 2 = C, we immediately have
Assuming (37), and continuing from (42)
On the other hand, assuming (38), and again continuing from (42) gives
which is the same bound as before.
B Proof of main text's Theorem 2
The Barker test amounts to checking the following condition:
N is the full dataset size, b is the batch size, s 2 ∆ * is the sample variance, and summation over [b] means summing over the elements in the batch.
In other words, with a slight abuse of notation and writing capital letters for random variables the mechanism releases a sample from
Var(R)) (55)
where (55) holds because R i are conditionally iid with a common distribution written as R, and Var(r) means the sample variance estimated from the actual iid sample r i , i ∈ [b] we have, i.e., a vector of length b.
Assume that
Proof. As a first step, we have
where the last inequality in (61) follows from (57).
Denote the maximally different adjacent datasets as r 1 , r 2 that produce draws from N 1 and N 2 respectively, parameterised with means and variances as in (56). W.l.o.g., we can assume that the differing element is the final one, so we have r 1,i = r 2,i , i = 1, . . . , b − 1. We write i ∈ [b − 1] to index a summation over the batch omitting the differing element.
The proof proceeds by bounding each of the terms f 1 , f 2 , f 3 in (59).
To start with, f 1 can be bounded as follows:
Var(r 1 ))| (64)
r 2 2,i + (r 2 ) 2 | (65)
where the final inequality in (63) holds because we have (62), and (70) as well as the final bound in (72) follow from (57).
For the common denominator term ασ 2 2 + (1 − α)σ 2 1 in f 2 and f 3 , we can first repeat essentially the previous calculation to get
Combining (78) and (62) we get
where the final inequality follows from (58).
For the numerator in f 3 we have
Finally, using the derived bounds in (72), (80), and (84) with the fact that σ 2 2 ≤ 2 from (62), the bound for the Rényi divergence (59) becomes
If we instead use the tempered log-likelihoods with temperature τ = N 0 N , the effect is to replace r i by τ r i . The same proof then holds when instead of N we write N 0 .
C Bounding the approximation errors
As mentioned in the main text, with finite data and b < N the acceptance test (18) in the main text is an approximation. For this case, there are some known theoretical bounds for the errors induced. The general idea with the following Theorems is that by bounding the errors induced by each approximation step, we can find a bound on the error in the stationary distribution of the approximate chain w.r.t. the exact posterior. The references in this Section mostly point to the main text. The exceptions are obvious from the context. First, Theorem 3 gives an upper bound for the error due to ∆ * having approximately normal instead of exactly normal distribution as in (53):
Proof. See Seita et al. 2017, Cor. 1 .
Next, we have a bound for the error in the test quantity (18) relative to the exact test (10) given in Theorem 4. The original proof [Seita et al., 2017, Cor. 2] assumes that C = 1 and (14) holds exactly. We present a slightly modified proof that holds for any C and also accounts for the error due to having only an approximate correction to the logistic distribution. We start with a helpful Lemma before the actual modified Theorem.
Lemma 4. Let P (x) and Q(x) be two CDFs satisfying sup x |P (x) − Q(x)| ≤ with x in some real range. Let R(y) be the density of another random variable Y . Let P be the convolution P * R and Q be the convolution Q * R. Then P (z) (resp. Q (z)) is the CDF of sum Z = X + Y of independent random variables X with CDF P (x) (resp. Q(x)) and Y with density R(y).
Then sup
Proof. See Seita et al. 2017, Lemma 4 .
where s ∆ * is the sample standard deviation of ∆ * , S is the cdf of the approximate logistic distribution produced by N (0, C) + X (C) cor , and S is the exact logistic function.
Proof. As in the original proof [Seita et al., 2017, Cor. 2] the main idea is to use Lemma 4 two times. First, take P (y) = P(∆ * < y), Q(y) = Φ( y−∆ s ∆ * ) and convolve with X nc which has density φ( ). For the second step, take the results P (y) = P(∆ * + X nc < y), Q (y) = Φ( y−∆ √ C ) and convolve with the density of X 
where (89) follows from the triangle inequality.
Finally, a bound on the test error implies a bound for the stationary distribution of the Markov chain relative to the true posterior, given in Theorem 5. Writing d v (P, Q) for the total variation distance between distributions P and Q, T 0 for the transition kernel of the exact Markov chain, S 0 for the exact posterior, and S for the stationary distribution of the approximate transition kernel where is the error in the acceptance test, we have:
Theorem 5. If T 0 satisfies the contraction condition d v (P T 0 , S 0 ) < ηd v (P, S 0 ) for some constant η ∈ [0, 1) and all probability distributions P , then
where is the bound on the error in the acceptance test.
Proof. See Korattikara et al. 2014 , Theorem 1 .
On a general level, especially the contraction condition in Theorem 5 can be hard to meet: it can be shown to hold e.g. for some Gibbs samplers (see e.g. Brémaud 1999, Theorem 6.1) but it is not usually valid for an arbitrary model, and even checking the condition might not be trivial.
D Numerical approximation of the correction distribution
As noted in the main text, we need to find an approximate distribution X (C) cor s.t.
where X log has a standard logistic distribution. The approximation method of Seita et al. [2017] casts the problem into a ridge regression problem, which can be solved effectively. However, nothing constrains the resulting function from having negative values. In order to use it as an approximate pdf, Seita et al. [2017] set these to zeroes and note that as long as C is small enough, such values are rare and hence do not affect the solution much. In practice, their solution seems to work very well with small values of C, e.g. when C ≤ 1.
Since we want to use larger C for the privacy, we propose to approximate X (C)
cor with a Gaussian mixture model (GMM). Since the result is always a valid pdf, the problem of negative values does not arise. Figure 7 shows the two approximations with increasing C. When the negative values in the ridge regression solution are projected to zeroes, the variance of X cor increases and the resulting approximateX log has variance much larger than the actual π 2 /3 it should have. This also shows in the resulting approximation. Figure 8 shows the empirical cdf for both approximations and for the true logistic distribution, and the absolute distance between the approximations S and the true logistic cdf S. Figure 7(a) shows the results for the ridge regression solution used by Seita et al. [2017] : as C increases, the amount of negative values that are projected to zeroes, which show as gaps in the log-pdf, increases markedly. Figure 7 (b) shows corresponding results for our GMM solution: the approximation is always a valid pdf over R.
To calculate the ridge regression solution for [−10, 10], we use the original code of Seita et al. [2017] with parameter values n = 4000, λ = 10.0 used in the original paper. The problems with larger C values persisted with other parameter settings we tested. Note that the discretisation granularity parameter n used in the two methods are not directly comparable.
To fit the GMMs with K components, we take the interval [−10, 10] with n = 1000 points for calculating the loss function, and run 20000 optimisation iterations with PyTorch [Paszke et al., 2017] . We use Adam optimiser [Kingma and Ba, 2014] with learning rate η = 0.01 and otherwise default settings. The approximation is forced to be symmetric about zero by adding mirrored components: for the kth component we add a copy but set the mean as −µ k , and set the weights as π k /2 for both, i.e., use the mean of the original and the mirrored component. We use K = 50 in the test, which gives 100 components with mirroring. Seita et al. [2017] and our GMM together with true logistic cdf. The variance of X cor using ridge regression is too high and the resulting X cor + N (0, C) is clearly off. The ecdf for GMM is almost indistinguishable from the true cdf. Figure 8(b) shows the absolute distances between the approximation ecdf and the true logistic cdf.
